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INTRODUCTION
The use of monetary incentives to induce people to behave in salubrious ways abounds, though it is as
controversial as it is ubiquitous (Brown, 2017). Few will have been surprised at offers of money since 2021 to
increase rates of vaccination against COVID-19. The Canadian province of Alberta and various U.S. states
offered entry to state lotteries with million-dollar prizes to those who had hitherto been slow to embrace
vaccines. In the summer of 2021, Greece started to offer younger members of the adult population 150 Euros
for vaccination (Sullivan, 2021), and in November of the same year, the Ukrainian government gave payments
of 1,000 hryvnias (35 Euros) per person to increase its rate of vaccination, one of Europe's lowest at 15% when
the incentive was introduced.1 Given that one-third of survey respondents in the U.S. express greater
willingness to be vaccinated in return for a modest payment, this seems to be money well spent. Evidence on
the effectiveness of monetary incentives in healthcare, especially in the long term, is, however, ambiguous
(Brown, 2017, 141), but even if the evidence bespoke the lasting efficacy of monetary incentives, some
commentators question whether efficacy be the only criterion for judging these incentives. One such criticism
is levelled by Michael Sandel who discusses monetary incentives generally, but pays particular attention to
their use in inducing drug addicts to agree to sterilization. Critics of monetary incentives have levelled the
charge of “bribery” against monetary payment in healthcare though the charge is often made with little
analysis. Sandel explores the bribery analogy in detail, and his work is worthy of scrutiny for that reason.
Sandel holds that monetary incentives involve “corruption”, a concept which, along with “coercion”, is central
to his critique of commodification in contemporary social life. He first makes this argument about payments to
drug addicts who, in return for money, agree to be sterilized; he proceeds to address the more general use of
money to prompt members of the public to take better care of their health.
This essay unfolds as follows. Section One explores cash for sterilization and Sandel's analysis thereof.
Sandel proposes a judicial analogy with which he justifies the term “bribery” to describe monetary payments
made to addicts in return for their consent to be sterilized. If the analogy is to hold, Sandel would have to show
that a drug addict who consents to sterilization in exchange for money acts illicitly. As I detail in Section Two,
Sandel offers two criteria according to which being sterilized for money might be illicit: that the transaction (i)
serves an “external end” and (ii) is against the interest of addicts. With regard to the latter criterion, one would
expect Sandel to state wherein addicts' interest lies, but he disappoints this expectation. In Section Three, I
undertake an analysis of the reasons for which addicts might agree to be sterilized in order to ascertain which
reasons for sterilization may be deemed to thwart addicts' interest. The analysis is continued empirically in
Section Four by examining evidence on both abortion and sterilization to ascertain how much light such
evidence can throw onto cash for sterilization. The evidence suggests that cash for sterilization is most
problematic when the offer of money compromises the autonomy of those contemplating sterilization. This
applies to drug addicts whose circumstances – addiction and often poverty – may be deemed to cajole them
into agreeing to be sterilized and thus compromise the voluntary nature of their consent. This argument aligns
with Sandel's coercion criticism of commodification rather than with his corruption objection. I conclude that
the latter objection is insufficiently developed to form an effective critique of monetary incentives in
healthcare. Sandel's critique of cash for sterilization derives its power from the notion of coercion, not from
corruption.
1

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-president-says-all-vaccinated-ukrainians-will-receive-1000-hryvnia-2021-11-15/.
Non-monetary rewards have also been offered, for instance, in some U.S. states which have given out free shot guns, beer and
marijuana; chickens have been given in return for vaccination in Indonesia, while some Chinese provinces offer eggs (Lewis, 2021; Qin
and Chien, 2021; Sullivan, 2021). Private corporations also offer financial rewards to employees who elect to be vaccinated
(https://www.dw.com/en/german-retailer-offers-bonus-to-vaccinated-workers/a-57217050)
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COERCION, C ORRUPTION, AND STERILIZATION
Project Prevention, a U.S.-based non-profit organization, has pioneered an approach to unintended
pregnancies involving drug-addicted people. The organization proposes a transaction between itself and its
clients – drug-addicted or alcoholic men and women (henceforth “addicts”) – which consists in a payment
from the organization in return for addicts' consent to long-term contraception or sterilization. Discussions of
this arrangement have focused on female addicts, particularly those who are sterilized in exchange for $300.
This focus reflects the small number of male clients whom the organization has persuaded to have a
vasectomy (401 to May, 2021) compared to the number of women who have made up the majority of the
organization's clients to date (7695). Of these female clients, 2444 have been sterilized (tubal ligation); the
modal form of birth control is the reversible IUD implant administered to nearly 3000 women.2
Sandel (45)3 rehearses the utilitarian justification of this transaction, according to which, if both parties
are rational and enter into the transaction voluntarily, both may be assumed to gain: the addict $300 and
Project Prevention the guarantee that the addict will not procreate; social welfare therefore increases and so
the transaction is ethically edifying on utilitarian grounds. An objection to this argument rests on the notion of
coercion: can an addict, possibly someone who lives in straitened financial circumstances, resist the offer of
$300? If not, the choice to be sterilized is not a truly voluntary one, for the addict is coerced by her
circumstances into accepting the offer (45). I return to the coercion objection to cash for sterilization in Section
Four but, in what follows, I attend to a different criticism of Project Prevention based on the notion of
corruption. This criticism, Sandel (1998, 95-96) argues, is conceptually independent of the coercion objection,
for it is based on a different “moral ideal”. The transaction between Project Prevention and an addict is
corrupt, “a form of bribery” (46). The bribery allegation has been made by others, both with respect to Project
Prevention (Chelian, 2003-4, 194-195), to other uses of monetary incentives promoting birth control (Sunil et
al., 1999, 564) and to the use of financial incentives to further salubrious behaviour unrelated to contraception
(Ashcroft, 2011). Sandel uses the term bribery in analogy with a judge who is bribed into issuing a crooked
verdict. The judge effectively “sells” the verdict and thereby uses his office as an instrument for personal gain,
not as a “public trust”; consequently the judge “degrades and demeans his office by treating it according to a
lower norm than is appropriate to it” (46). The latter phrase encapsulates Sandel's “broader definition” of
corruption. By analogy, addicts who transact with Project Prevention sell something which should not be sold
– their reproductive capacity. They thereby treat this capacity inappropriately – not as a “gift or trust to be
exercised according to norms of responsibility and care”, but as a tool for monetary gain (46-47).
Because the concept of bribery is central to this essay, I offer a definition of bribery on the basis of
which my critical analysis of Sandel follows.
1) A bribe is a sum of money offered by person B who has the intention of prompting person A, to whom
the money is offered, to perform an action, α. (Although a bribe may be non-monetary, I will assume
that it is monetary).
2) B assumes thereby that, but for the bribe, A would not perform action α. (If B assumed that A would
perform α irrespective of the bribe, the bribe would be otiose; if A performs α because of the bribe,
one may say that the bribe motivates A to perform α).
3) Action α is illicit.
All three conditions are fulfilled in the case of the corrupt judge. If Sandel's analogy is to work, they must also
apply to the case of cash for sterilization. Is this so?
Project Prevention offers money to addicts with the intention of convincing them to be sterilized; this
is the stated purpose of the organization, and so point 1) of the definition is fulfilled. The organization assumes
thereby that, in the absence of payment, the addicts would not agree to be sterilized. It is, furthermore,
2

http://www.projectprevention.org/statistics/. There is an irony about the female focus in commentaries on Project Prevention, for the
earliest monetary incentives for birth control were offered to men willing to have a vasectomy in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu in 1956
(Sunil et al., 1999: 563).
3
All references given by page number only refer to Sandel (2012).
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plausible to assume that many of the organization's clients who have undergone some form of birth control
would not have done so had it not been for Project Prevention's offer. Consequently, point 2) of our definition
of bribery is fulfilled. Before we explore whether cash for sterilization fulfils point 3), we must clarify it by
returning to the judge.
In the judge's case, action α (delivering a false verdict) is illicit independent of the bribe. Accepting a
bribe is but one reason for delivering a false verdict, and there are other reasons which might motivate a judge
to do so, e.g., personal animus or racial bias. Being motivated by such factors makes the judgement illicit
without a monetary bribe. In fact, it is hard to imagine a reason that would justify the the wilful
pronouncement of a crooked verdict; delivering such a verdict is inherently wrong. Is the case of cash for
sterilization similar? That is, are there no conceivable reasons which would justify a drug addict's decision to be
sterilized? If not, then, like the judge's issuing of a crooked verdict, action α (the addict's consenting to being
sterilized) would be illicit regardless whether the addict was offered money, and the analogy with the judge
would hold. However, to contend that it is never justified that a drug addict be sterilized is an extreme position.
Although Sandel does not expostulate explicitly on the matter, this extreme position is not one which we can
ascribe to him.
Sandel addresses this point obliquely through an argument which he puts into the mouth of an
imaginary interlocutor who states: “Money aside, the woman does no wrong if she chooses to be sterilized”
(47). The interlocutor clearly believes that there are justifiable reasons for being sterilized, although these
reasons are not specified. From the fact that there are justifiable reasons for sterilization, Sandel's interlocutor
infers that, since a woman has “a right to give up her childbearing capacity for reasons of her own, … she must
also have the right to do so for a price” (47). Sandel's reply to his interlocutor is non-committal: he merely
notes that “we have to figure out what norms should govern our sexual and procreative lives” in order to
ascertain whether market relations belong there (47); he therefore takes no explicit stance on the matter. With
that, Sandel interrupts his discussion of cash for sterilization. Hence, it remains unclear whether Sandel agrees
with his interlocutor that there are reasons which justify the addict's decision to be sterilized and, if so, what
these reasons are. Consequently, the closeness of the analogy between the judge and the addict remains
unspecified. Is an addict's decision to be sterilized in exchange for money ever justified? A negative answer, as I
have just noted, would be an extreme, uncompromising view. An affirmative answer, by contrast, would mean
that being sterilized in return for money is not always wrong, and this would constitute a difference between
an addict and a judge whose delivery of a crooked verdict is always wrong. If Sandel supported an affirmative
answer to the question, one would expect him to differentiate the conditions under which consenting to
sterilization is licit from those under which it is illicit. His main discussion of cash for sterilization offers no such
differentiation, though he returns to cash for sterilization in his more general discussion of “health bribes” to
which we attend in the following section.

ENDS AND REASONS – INTRINSIC AND EXTERNAL
Sandel offers a general discussion of monetary incentives in healthcare, e.g., to encourage people to give up
smoking or lose weight. In what follows, I use the example of losing weight to illustrate his criticism of health
bribes and then ask in which ways it differs from his criticism of cash for sterilization.
A person who takes steps to lose weight in return for money acts in a way which serves an external
end. As an example of an external, Sandel mentions “reducing health costs for companies or a national health
service” (58). He contrasts these ends which losing weight promotes with the reasons for which people might
choose to lose weight. What, according to Sandel, makes financial payments for losing weight questionable, is
that the recipient of the payment loses weight for an external reason, namely, the prospect of acquiring
money. Note that the category of external reason is independent of the category of external end. The external
reason of wanting to acquire money is the “wrong” reason for losing weight; it supplants a “better”, intrinsic,
reason. This intrinsic reason issues, not from a desire to acquire money, but from a proper attitude of care and
respect for one's body. Money, however, “tricks” a person into losing weight, and though losing weight is in
the person's interest, because it improves his health, the manipulation involved in offering people money is
Peacock
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what makes this practice bribery (59). Let us compare this account of health bribes in general with Sandel's
account of cash for sterilization.
Like health bribes generally, cash for sterilization serves an external end. When addicts undergo
sterilization, the monetary incentive prompts them “to relinquish their reproductive capacity not for their own
good but for the sake of an external end—preventing more drug-addicted babies” (58). Health bribes differ
from cash for sterilization, however, when it comes to the interest of the person to whom a payment is
offered: whereas a payment to lose weight prompts an overweight person to act in his own interest, addicts
who accept cash for sterilization “are being paid to act, in many cases at least, against their interest” (58
emphasis added). This, Sandel holds, makes the use of the term “bribery” all the more compelling with regard
to sterilization, though in the context of health bribes, he argues, the term “bribery” is apposite on account of
the “trick” involved in motivating people to lose weight for the wrong reason, viz., acquiring money. One
might contend, pace Sandel, that the term “bribery”, to describe the case of paying people to lose weight, is
misplaced, for it differs decisively from the case of the corrupt judge: the person who loses weight when paid
to do so is, according to Sandel, doing the right thing for the wrong reason; the judge, by contrast, who, acting
on a bribe, finds an innocent person guilty, is not doing the right thing for the wrong reason but is doing
something intrinsically wrong. This would seem to vitiate any analogy between judicial corruption and paying
people to stay healthy, though Sandel uses the term “bribery” to describe both.
Returning to the case of sterilization, Sandel does not explicitly address the reasons addicts have for
being sterilized; indeed, in contrast to his discussion of health bribes, one finds no distinction between external
and intrinsic reasons in his discussion of sterilization. But rather than assume that reasons are irrelevant to
Sandel's analysis of the latter, one may reconstruct his approach in a manner which accords a role to the
reasons for which addicts agree to sterilization. Indeed, it is imperative to investigate the reasons addicts have
for being sterilized if we are to assess Sandel's claim that being sterilized in exchange for money is against
their interests.
By offering money to addicts, Sandel holds, Project Prevention “tricks” them into being sterilized, and
the addicts thereby become instruments who act in a way which serves an external end, namely, to prevent
the birth of drug-addicted babies. What makes this end external? One indication of its externality is to
consider how addicts would answer the following question: Why are you agreeing to the offer made by Project
Prevention? Sandel seems to presume that addicts would reply: “In order to get some cash” and not: “In order
to reduce the number of drug-addicted babies”. If this is Sandel's presumption, the goal of preventing the birth
of drug-addicted babies which the sterilization of addicts certainly serves would answer to the name of an
external end from the perspectives of addicts, for it does not play a part in motivating them to agree to
sterilization.4 From the perspective of Project Prevention, by contrast, reducing the number of drug-addicted
babies constitutes a reason for sterilizing addicts. What motivates addicts to agree to the terms of the
transaction is the prospect of earning money which, in turn, allows them to acquire drugs. This, at least, is the
position I ascribe to Sandel, for although he does not refer to addicts' reasons for being sterilized, this is the
most charitable way of rendering his position, and it corresponds to the way in which he himself analyses
health bribes.
Addicts, if we pursue this reconstruction of Sandel's position, agree to be sterilized for the wrong
(external) reason, namely, the prospect of acquiring money. Like recipients of health bribes for losing weight,
addicts are manipulated into being sterilized by the offer of money. But Sandel notes a difference between
recipients of health bribes and the drug-addicted clients of Project Prevention: whereas the former are tricked
into doing something which accords with the own interest, addicts do not, “in many cases at least”, act in their
own interest when they agree to be sterilized (58). The phrase quoted raises the following question: which
criterion separates the “many cases” in which addicts act against, from those in which they act in, their own
interest? This is something we will explore in the following section when we consider reasons for sterilization.
Sandel also leaves a further question unanswered: what would he counsel addicts to do? In the case of health
4

This understanding of external reasons corresponds roughly to the standard philosophical use of the term, see Finlay and Schroeder
(2017).
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bribes, one may infer his answer to the question: “What is to be done?”, namely: overweight people should
lose weight, but they should do so, not because a healthcare provider proffers them money for doing so, but
because they have cultivated an attitude of care and respect for their body. But what should addicts do – what
are good (intrinsic) reasons for being sterilized if money constitutes a bad reason? Or should addicts refrain
from being sterilized and do something else instead? These are questions which Sandel leaves unanswered.

REASONS FOR STERILIZATION
Project Prevention aims to reduce births of drug-addicted babies and pays addicts to be sterilized in order to
reach this end. In the previous section I argued that the end of preventing the birth of drug-addicted babies
was external to the concerns of addicts in the sense that reaching this end is not what motivates them to agree
to being sterilized. This suggests a dissonance between the ends the organization pursues and those pursued
by addicts when they agree to be sterilized. It also strengthens Sandel's view that addicts are tricked into this
transaction: in return for money, addicts aid Project Prevention in the pursuit of an end which the organization
deems worthy of pursuit (preventing the birth of addicted babies), though the addicts' interest is not served by
this transaction.
If, however, one takes Project Prevention at its word, decreasing births of addicted babies is a
necessary consequence of its program, but it is not an end in itself. This can be inferred from the fact that
Project Prevention mentions other ends which it pursues. If we examine these other ends, we can ascertain
whether there is greater congruence between ends pursued by the Project Prevention and ends pursued by
addicts. We can descry whether any of these ends might provide good (“intrinsic”) reasons for addicts' choice
to be sterilized and whether being sterilized for such reasons redounds to the interest of addicts. If so, it would
cast the relationship between Project Prevention and its clients in a different light.
One goal after which Project Prevention strives is to reduce the amount of taxpayers' money spent on
foster care and alleviating the caseload of social workers. These costs, the organization avers, might exceed
$300,000 per child during the latter's lifetime.5 The ends of reducing taxpayers' money and the burden on
social workers are presumably external to the concerns of addicts who, we have been presuming, are more
likely motivated by the receipt of $300. And this is apparently how Project Prevention conceives addicts'
motivation, as revealed in an advertisement which states: “Don't let a pregnancy ruin your drug habit” (Chelian,
2003-4, 189-190). A not uncharitable interpretation of this slogan suggests that addicts should agree to
sterilization in order to earn $300 which, in turn, will allow them to acquire the narcotic to which they are
addicted. Furthermore, one may contend that acquiring money in order to further their consumption of drugs
is not in the interest of addicts who accede to sterilization. This might explain the cynicism which Project
Prevention's methods meet in the eyes of the organization's critics. But before we dismiss the motives behind
Project Prevention as purely manipulative, let us consider further ends which the organization purports to
pursue and ask whether they might constitute reasons of a less external nature to the concerns of addicts who
contemplate sterilization.
An end which Project Prevention mentions is to spare as yet unborn children of the suffering which
follows from both abuse and neglect at the hands of their parents and of fetal alcohol disorders which result in
conditions deleterious to a child's life (see Chasnoff, 1988). The end of preventing children's suffering might
play a role in addicts' deliberation about whether to be sterilized. If it does, this end should not be described as
“external” to addicts' concerns. Moreover, an addict whose decision to be sterilized were swayed by concerns
for the future child's health and welfare, would arguably be using her reproductive system according to the
ethic of care and responsibility which Sandel admonishes us to exercise towards our reproductive capacities
(47). This ethic of care would be exercised toward possible future children of the addict. Being sterilized out of
concern for the fate of one's future children arguably qualifies as an “intrinsic” reason for sterilization, though
it is unclear whether an addict would be acting in her own interest rather than in that of the unborn child if she
5

http://www.projectprevention.org/objectives/; http://www.projectprevention.org/whats-new/. The organization's website provides no
source for this figure.
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agrees to be sterilized in order to avoid harm to the child. Indeed, if she divests herself of the ability to have
children at a future time, when, perhaps, she is no longer drug dependent, an addict who is sterilized on
account of concerns for children born to her whilst she is addicted might be held to be sacrificing her own
interest in having future progeny. This might be described as an other-regarding reason to be sterilized, and it
would appear to be a responsible thing to do.
A further goal for which Project Prevention strives is to “alleviate from our clients the burden of having
children that will potentially be taken away”.6 Given the organization's emphasis on financial savings, one may
suppose that concern for addicts is not foremost in the minds of the organization's personnel, but one may
concede that giving birth to a child who is forcibly separated from its mother and taken into foster care causes
immense emotional pain to the mother. If this consideration plays a role in an addict's decision be sterilized,
there is a prima facie case for arguing that being sterilized expresses an attitude of responsibility and care
toward oneself on the part of the addict; she would be assessing the consequences of giving birth and the
future pain which might accrue to her if her child be made a ward of the state. There is, furthermore, a case for
arguing that being sterilized, because it saves the addict from potential emotional pain, is her interest.
The foregoing discussion suggests that cash for sterilization serves more than the immediate end of
reducing the birth of drug-addicted babies. Once other ends are acknowledged, it is arguable that addicts who
agree to sterilization are (a) using their reproductive system in line with an ethic of care and responsibility and
(b) acting in a way which furthers rather than thwarts their interest. One might, at this point, declare a
stalemate in the debate between Sandel and proponents of Project Prevention, with both sides speculating
about the reasons for addicts agreeing to be sterilized. If, as Sandel holds, most addicts are motivated by the
prospect of acquiring money which they use to further their drug consumption, one may build a case for
saying that sterilization is against the interests of addicts. If Project Prevention is right about other ends which
the transaction between itself and its clients serve and if serving such ends plays a role in the deliberation of
addicts who contemplate being sterilized, the case for arguing that sterilization is against addicts' interests is
less strong. Only empirical investigation into addicts' reasoning will be able to determine which side has the
stronger argument. Alas, survey research on addicts and their reasons for being sterilized is scarce.
Nevertheless, evidence which relates to the matter is not entirely lacking, and I will consider it in the section
which follows.

EVIDENCE
If there is a lack of evidence pertaining directly to addicts' reasons for sterilization, might other evidence shed
light on the issue at hand? There is abundant evidence on women's reasons for abortion and for sterilization,
and though it pertains largely to non-addicted populations, one may cautiously draw inferences from this
evidence with the following caveats. First, abortion is not the same as sterilization. In some societies, the
former is more morally charged, and this might be a cause for hesitation to abort which is lacking with regard
to sterilization. Reasons for abortion might therefore differ from those lying behind sterilization. Nevertheless,
both sterilization and abortion are types of birth control to which some considerations are common. Second,
in jurisdictions with strict legal provisions on abortion or a vibrant anti-abortion lobby, access to abortion can
be hindered by a lack of clinics performing legal abortions (where abortion is legal) and the requirement that a
woman receive counselling prior to abortion (Gerdts et al., 2016; Joyce et al., 2009; Keefe-Oates et al., 2020).
These obstacles are more often absent in the context of sterilization, although access to sterilization is far
from open or equally distributed (Borrero et al., 2012; Zite et al., 2006), and in some societies, remaining
childless carries social disapprobation; couples which do not procreate can be frowned upon, whereby it is
often the woman who receives blame for the childless state of a heterosexual union (cf. Riessman, 2000).
Attention to cultural and legal context is therefore important when one compares reasons given for abortion
with those for sterilization. Third, abortion, unlike sterilization, does not divest a woman of the capacity to
produce progeny in the future, and the decision whether to abort is likely to focus on shorter-term
6
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considerations rather than the long-term implications which women who contemplate sterilization take into
account. Fourth, when considering the evidence presented below, both that on abortion and on sterilization,
we must hold in mind that it comes from the experience of women rather than of addicted women. Some
studies, however, include drug-related reasons for abortion or sterilization, and these are relevant to the
concerns of the drug-addicted clients of Project Prevention.
Abortion
Women's reasons for contemplating or having an abortion are many in number and varied in content (Finer et
al., 2005, 117; Kirkman et al., 2010, 150). Prevalent amongst them are worries that the rearing of a child will
have unwanted effects on the woman's life. Financial issues loom large, but so do worries that a child will upset
a woman's career or educational aspirations (a reason cited more often by younger, childless and unmarried
women) or that a child might disturb the existing life of a woman in other ways (Broen et al., 2005; Finer et al.,
2005). These reasons might be described as “self-interested” because they concern the mother's assessment
of her own interests in light of the prospect of becoming a mother. Other reasons, by contrast, are
other-regarding. These include considerations of the possible negative impact of a new child on one's extant
children or on one's relationship with one's intimate partner (Finer et al., 2005, 117; Kirkman et al., 2009,
374-375). A further other-regarding reason pertains to the well-being of the child. These well-being-related
reasons include the concern that the child, were it born, would not be wanted or loved (Kirkman et al., 2009,
374). Intimate partner violence may also be included here, and there is a strong correlation between such
violence and the desire for abortion (Taft et al., 2019). Solicitude about the future child's physical health is also
weighed by women as a reason to terminate a pregnancy (Finer et al., 2005, 112; Kirkman et al., 2009, 373).
Project Prevention's stated aim of reducing the suffering of children born to addicts is thus shared by some
women who, once pregnant, seek abortion for reasons concerning the well-being, or lack of it, of the potential
future child.
Concerns about alcohol, tobacco and drug use by women during pregnancy feature amongst reasons
for seeking abortion. Substance-abuse-related reasons for abortion relate, not only to damage done to the
foetus during pregnancy, but also to possible postpartum drug use by women and their partners. Substance
abuse was identified as a reason to abort by 5% of the nearly 1000 respondents in a U.S. survey undertaken
between 2008 and 2010; women mentioned it as a factor which would detract from their parental skills and
their ability to provide an environment in which a child would thrive (Roberts et al., 2012, 642). There is a
strong association between drug use and abortion, whereby illegal drug use is more strongly correlated to
abortion than is the use of legally available drugs (Taft et al., 2019, 139). Some of the survey respondents who
consider abortion for drug-related reasons will have similar profiles to those of Project Prevention's clients
prior to being sterilized. Those respondents whose reason for abortion is related to their partner's drug use,
however, are not necessarily drug users themselves, and the studies cited do not allow one to differentiate the
women's drug use from that of their partners.
In the previous section, I cited a third end pursued by Project Prevention, namely, the end of avoiding
emotional pain to mothers who have a child removed from their care. This does not feature explicitly in
women's reasons for seeking abortion. This reason might be included in women's assessment of their
envisaged competence and readiness to be a parent, for any factor which might constitute a reason for
thinking one would be a “bad parent” can induce solicitude about losing custody over one's child. Again, the
categories which structure the data do not allow for the fine-grained differentiation required for identifying a
desire to avoid the aforementioned emotional pain as a reason for abortion.
The evidence on abortion is of some, but limited, use in illuminating the reasons why addicts might
seek to be sterilized for money. Of the reasons for abortion mentioned above, none is obviously devoid of the
responsibility and care that Sandel admonishes women to exercise in using their reproductive systems.
Whether one is prompted to terminate a pregnancy on account of concern for oneself, one's education or
career, for the unborn child, one's extant children or intimate partner, there is nothing irresponsible or
uncaring in the deliberations about abortion. Sandel, though, would have a retort to this contention, to wit:
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granted, many of these reasons for abortion manifest responsibility and care – toward oneself and others – in
the use of one's reproductive capacity, and abortion, when undertaken for these reasons can, no doubt,
redound to the interest of women; but the question is not whether women in general have good reasons for
abortion but whether drug-addicted women are capable of the ratiocination manifested by the mainly
non-addicted women whose reasons for abortion are reported in studies. Is it not more reasonable, Sandel
would ask, to assume that addicts' deliberation about abortion will be skewed towards undertaking actions
which allow them to feed their addiction? Addicts, Sandel might continue, will further their short-term
(perceived) interests by grasping the opportunity to earn money, but doing so is likely to come at the expense
of their long-term good? If the money received in return for sterilization facilitates the acquisition of drugs,
offering addicts money will induce them to do whatever allows them to acquire it without sufficient
consideration of interests they have, particularly those of a long-term nature, other than the procurement of
drugs. Studies of decision-making amongst addicts suggest that this thought is correct.7 From time-to-time,
studies report addicts electing to have an abortion for the reason that pregnancy and/or motherhood would
detract from efforts to rid themselves of addiction (Roberts et al., 2012, 642-643). Such reasons give one prima
facie reason to believe that addicts can deliberate rationally about abortion and comes to decisions which are
in their long-term interest. But such reasons feature too rarely to allow one to contend that addicts, more
generally, are capable of making choices which promotes their long-term interests.
Evidence on abortion, then, bespeaks often well-reasoned and responsible decision-making by
women who consider terminating a pregnancy, but such evidence, because it focuses mainly on the reasons of
women who are not dependent on drugs, is insufficient to remove the suspicion that specifically drug-addicted
women have less well-considered reasons for abortion because their attention is disproportionately occupied
by acquiring drugs and the monetary means for doing so. Mercantile reasons, are, as Sandel contends, not
obviously in women's interest.
Sterilization
Often, sterilization follows from a woman's ascertaining that she does not wish to have (further) children. The
relative reliability of sterilization as a contraceptive procedure as well as the side-effects of other contraceptive
methods account for the relative popularity of sterilization.8 The irreversibility of tubal ligation, however, can
give rise to post-sterilization regret which issues from a change of mind about not wanting to have (further)
children, frequently induced by divorce or the death of extant children. The incidence of regret is higher
amongst women below the age of 30 than amidst their post-30-year-old counterparts (Hillis et al., 1999,
891-892; Shreffler et al., 2015). A further factor correlated with post-sterilization regret concerns the process
through which the decision to be sterilized goes: those women who exercise less control over the decision are
more likely to experience regret. Because it is relevant to an assessment of cash for sterilization in a way which
will become apparent below, the issue of control of decision-making which leads to sterilization requires closer
examination.
Following Shreffler et al. (2015, 36-37), who explored reasons for sterilization in the United States, one
may posit a continuum between “voluntary” and “involuntary” reasons for sterilization. At the voluntary end of
the continuum stand reasons which accord with the preferences of women, such as not wishing to have
(further) children. A decision based on this reason is voluntary in the sense that it is free of external necessity;
it not forced on women but one they can make with maximal autonomy. At the opposite, involuntary, end of
the spectrum are decisions based on necessity or compulsion. Forced sterilization, in which women have no
choice, has been common in recent history, though it is not the sort of involuntariness with which we are
presently concerned (see Bruinius, 2006; Patel, 2017). Paradigmatic for sterilization based on necessity are
7

See behavioural studies of addicts decision-making, e.g. Heshmat (2015). “Present bias” is a common flaw of decision-making
amongst those who are not addicted to drugs and it is a reason for casting aspersion on the ethical permissibility of offering money in
exchange for sterilization (Heil et al., 2012).
8
Tubal ligation is the most common form of contraception used by women in some countries (Boring et al., 1988, 973; Hillis et al., 1999,
889-890).
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cases in which further procreation might be life threatening for a woman who elects to be sterilized to avoid
the risk. Between these poles lie reasons which make the sterilization decision more or less voluntary,
depending on the degree autonomy a woman feels she has in making the decision. Sterilization for the reason
a woman feels unable to shoulder the financial burden of rearing children would fall between the poles.9
One factor which detracts from the voluntariness of the decision to be sterilized is “pressure from
others”, be those others husbands (intimate partners), family members or medical practitioners. The odds of
reporting post-sterilization regret are highest amongst women who agree to sterilization as a result of
pressure from others (Shreffler et al., 2015, 42; Boring et al., 1988; Brault et al., 2016). A similar finding is met
in studies of abortion, whereby “pressure from a male partner” was the reason most strongly associated with
retrospective feelings of a negative nature toward the decision to abort (Broen et al., 2005, 41). A further
indicator of lack of autonomy is the degree of misinformation women have about sterilization, and this factor,
too, is positively correlated with post-sterilization regret (Borrero et al., 2012).
The lack of autonomy associated with choices made under pressure diminishes the extent to which
one “owns” the choice in question. This applies, not only to women whose decision to be sterilized is urged
upon them by an intimate partner, doctor or family member, but also to those whose circumstances dragoon
them into acceding to sterilization. Such are the circumstances of many addicts, whose craving for drugs
induces them to consent to actions which will facilitate their access to drugs. Sandel holds that the money
Project Prevention offers to addicts “may be too tempting to resist. Given her addiction and, in most cases, her
poverty, her choice to be sterilized for $300 may not really be free. She may be coerced, in effect, by the
necessity of her circumstances” (45). Although Sandel does not explore in detail the circumstances under
which circumstances coerce, he traverses well-trodden philosophical territory when he argues that straitened
circumstances detract from the voluntariness of choice. The point is voiced by many who comment on
financial incentives in healthcare, including on Project Prevention's methods (Ashcroft, 2011; Chelian, 2003-4;
Morgan, 2004; Voigt, 2017; Wild and Pratt, 2017).
The extent to which addicts' decisions are truly voluntary is a matter of dispute (Foddy and Savulescu,
2006; Racine and Rousseau-Lesage, 2017). Yet the empirical relationship between less autonomy of choice and
post-sterilization regret suggests that addicts who accept Project Prevention's offer are more likely to feel
regret as a result of consenting to sterilization under conditions which denudes their choice of autonomy. This
gives content to Sandel's claim that addicts act against their interest when they are coerced by addiction and
poverty into agreeing to be sterilized; for by doing so, addicts are exposing themselves to post-sterilization
regret which, in turn, indicates that, when they give their consent, they fail to judge their long-term interest
correctly. This is what makes cash for sterilization illicit, and, on account of its illicitness, it represents bribery,
for which our third, and hitherto elusive condition, was that the act performed by the addict, like the delivery
of the crooked verdict by the judge, be illicit.

CONCLUSION: C OERCION AND CORRUPTION – A R EFRAIN
If the train of thought with which I closed the previous section vindicates Sandel's critique of cash for
sterilization, he has scored a somewhat Pyrrhic victory, for his argument that cash for sterilization be an
instance of bribery relies on the notion of coercion; it is, to reiterate, a combination of addiction and limited
financial resources which compromise addicts' autonomy in deciding whether to be sterilized for money, and
this makes their act illicit in the sense that it does not redound to their interest. However, the charge of
bribery, in Sandel's view, aligns itself with the concept of corruption and is conceptually independent of
coercion. Sandel repeatedly states that the corruption objection would remain even if all concerns about
coercion and the voluntariness of choice were removed. But corruption, if it plays a role at all in the objection
to cash for sterilization, stands on the shoulders of the coercion objection without which the corruption
objection is not compelling.
9

An interesting, though troubling, reason for sterilization is used in plea bargaining, whereby if a guilty party agrees to sterilization, she
or he will receive a lenient sentence (see Riley, 2006). Such practices presumably compromise the voluntariness of the sterilization
decision.
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Sandel is unlikely to be enamoured of a critique of cash for sterilization that relies, as the foregoing
analysis does, on the concept of autonomy; for autonomy is a concept he associates with the “proceduralism”
of modern liberal political theory which prizes the ability of autonomous individuals to make free choices over
ends according to the value that they place on those ends. The procedural nature of modern liberalism
circumvents collective discussions about the “norms [which] should govern our sexual and procreative lives”
(47) and instead leaves it to individuals to make their own valuations and choices in matters deemed to be
private.10 Sandel's contribution to such collective discussion is, however, insufficient as a basis for establishing
grounds which might help us to decide which norms are appropriate. In particular, his conception of women's
interest and of the circumstances under which cash for sterilization thwarts their interest is underdeveloped.
Hence he is unable to ground his corruption-based objection to the use of monetary incentives, for the
objection from corruption requires thorough analysis of the correct attitude one should cultivate toward one's
health and the interests which the adoption of this attitude serves. In lieu of more compelling arguments
about such matters, we may be left with no criterion for assessing cash for sterilization other than according to
the degree of autonomy accorded to addicts who agree to sterilization. This assessment draws its strength
from the concept of coercion, not from the concept of corruption.
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